the adaptation of national legislation to the rules established within the EEC? What was their role with regard to European integration in their own perspective? In which areas did the process of European integration lead to institutional adaptations? Did the business associations themselves become more European? What was the impact of other international organisations (GATT/WTO, OECD, UNO) on institutional change in comparison with European integration?
I shall concentrate on the most influential business association, the federation of trade and industry SHIV (Schweizerischer Handels-und Industrieverein), the associations of the main export-oriented branches machines and chemicals, VSM (Verein Schweizerischer Maschinen-Industrieller) and SSCI (Swiss Society of Chemical Industries) as well as on the federation of the inward oriented branches SGV (Schweizerischer Gewerbeverband).
EUROPEANIZATION IN THE FOREFRONT OF THE SINGLE EUROPEAN MARKET

SWISS FEDERATION OF TRADE AND INDUSTRY (SHIV)
On the national level, the SHIV participated in practically all government committees dealing with economic policies and legal reforms. It represented the economic interests of its members, and these interests were identified through surveys or at internal meetings and conferences. 5 The SHIV was associated with several international organisations: UNICE (Union des Industries des pays de la Communauté européenne), CIFE (Conseil des féderations industrielles d'Europe), BIAC (Business and Industry Advisory Committee to OECD) and ICC (International Chamber of Commerce). In the late 1980s, participation in the UNICE became more and more important.
Until 1986, the impact of European integration on the activities of the SHIV remained rather marginal and limited to specific topics. The main themes were minor adaptations, clarifications or revisions of the free trade agreement between EEC and EFTA concluded in 1972, the simplification of the rules of origin, guidelines for a common European product liability law, the adjustment of trademark rights in the member states and the question how the non-member states could participate in these simplifications. 6 One major concern was the tendency, in a period marked by a worldwide recession and high unemployment rates in the EECcountries, to raise trade barriers between the European free trade area and the EEC. With the economic upswing felt since 1983 the apprehension of a new wave of protectionism disappeared, but it was feared that the project of creating a single European market would lead to the creation of new boundaries for economic exchange within Europe. A possible counter measure was to conclude an agreement between the EFTA and the EEC in order to avoid such an outcome.
7 Still, the SHIV did not want to have its hands tied to a regional system. The degree of economic integration with the EEC-area was high, but about 40% of total Swiss exports were delivered to non-European markets and direct investments in overseas countries were considerable. According to the SHIV, Switzerland had primarily to take an active part in the GATT-negotiations, which had started in November 1982. The international organisations OECD and UNO also acted as rule-setters with regard to international trade and the behaviour of multinational companies, but their impact was regarded as rather marginal, because they produced mainly 'soft rules', which could be applied voluntarily. Their guidelines were mere recommendations, limited to identifying problems and suggesting solutions.
8
During the early 1980s the EEC as rule setter was completely absent. Most major topics of economic policy, such as competition and energy policy or the revision of the sales tax and of the law on cartels, were discussed without any reference to the European context. That was even the case for the first steps towards deregulating the telecommunication sector initiated in 1984.
9 Quite generally, deregulation and privatisation were considered as purely domestic topics.
10 Research and development (R&D) was the only field of economic policy directly influenced by a programme of the European Commission for promoting science and technology during the period 1984-87. At first, the SHIV was sceptical with regard to the role of the state in stimulating R&D, although, compared with other European countries, the high share of private companies in total R&D expenditures in Switzerland was perceived as exceptional.
11 But international competition in R&D became more pronounced, and the SHIV was concerned about the fact that the increase of R&D expenditures of Swiss firms abroad was higher than at home. The state-backed participation in international and especially EC R&D-programmes was reconsidered and finally approved. At the same time, domestic policies promoting R&D were strengthened.
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From 1987 onwards, the creation of the single European market and its consequences for the Swiss economy became the dominant theme and determined the agenda for institutional reforms: Deregulation and privatisation of state-owned enterprises in Switzerland were a matter of concern, because Switzerland was lagging behind compared with EEC-countries, 13 and the service sector was identified as an important area of liberalisation, because the EEC assigned high priority to this topic in completing the single European market.
14 This ambitious programme embraced all major service sectors (financial services, transport and traffic systems, telecommunication, capital transactions) and included tax regulations as well as measures for promoting the free movement of labour. Even agrarian policy was no longer conceived as a purely internal affair. The agrarian sector was coming under pressure both from the single European market and the Uruguay-round of the GATT.
15 How should Switzerland react to all these challenges? 16 The immediate effect of the decision to create a single European market for services, was increased uncertainty. Switzerland seemed ill prepared for this type of market integration. Little room of manoeuvre was perceived with regard to banking and transport services. In the field of telecommunication it seemed inevitable for Switzerland to cooperate with the EEC, and the same was the case for the energy sector.
According to the SHIV what was going on in Europe had to become an integral part of the internal discussion on economic policies.
17 But the GATT-negotiations should not get out of sight, because the Uruguay-round was to determine the rules valid for international trade in the years to come, independently of whether they were a success or not.
18 It was important for Swiss firms to remain competitive on markets outside the EEC. A large part of Swiss exports were directed to overseas markets, and economic growth rates were higher in the US and in Asia than in the European countries.
19
One possibility for coping with the changing conditions within Europe were measures, which could be taken autonomously, such as strengthening the competitiveness of the Swiss economy in general or reducing the potential for conflicts with the EEC.
20 One proposition was to replace the existing sales tax with a value added tax, another to develop an acceptable solution for the transit traffic through the Alps.
21 A promising way out of the threatening division of Europe was the proposal of the European Commission to expand the 'four freedoms' of the single market for goods, services, persons and capital to the EFTA-countries and create a European Economic Area (EEA).
22 This proposal was the main topic of the EFTA Summit-Meeting in March 1989. Discussions revealed different positions: Austria intended to apply for EC-membership, Sweden and Norway aimed at full participation within the single European market, Switzerland was in favour of an extensive cooperation with the EEC, but had to respect the constraints imposed by the internal political situation.
23 For the SHIV the main question was how the expanded single market would have to be conceived in order to be acceptable for the large majority of firms in the main branches of the Swiss economy. At the end of the 1980s the international economic context the SHIV tried to cope with had become extremely complex, and the process of European integration continued at a very fast pace. Already in December 1990 there were conferences on the creation of a monetary and a political union. Austria applied for EC membership in 1989 and Sweden planned to do so in 1991. Even countries in Central and Eastern Europe aimed at joining the European Community.
25 For the SHIV, an organisation used to the slow pace of institutional change in Switzerland -where every modification has to go through various rounds of consultations before it is presented in parliament, and after having been accepted in parliament there is still the possibility of a referendum -the pace of European integration must have been breathtaking.
The increasing importance of the EEC was also reflected in the decision taken in 1988 to establish an office in Brussels. At that time, the SHIV was the only member of the UNICE without a permanent representation. The strengthened link with UNICE was conceived as a major and direct source of information on ECmatters for Swiss firms, especially for the large number of small and mediumsized enterprises.
26
The process of establishing the EEA clearly dominated the agenda up to autumn 1992. The tendency was to shift pending negotiations (for example simplifying the rules of origin) into the EEA-package. 27 In several fields of legislation the influence of European integration became stronger: the committee in charge of the revision of the Swiss Corporation Law, for example, noticed a contradiction with EC-notions and took it into account; the enactment of the EC-guideline on product liability immediately provoked corresponding activities of the EFTAstates and the revision of the Swiss liability law;
28 also with regard to foreign labour, the creation of the EEA gave rise to rules that complied with the EC.
29 However, in some areas the influence of EC-rules was still limited or even firmly rejected. Rather surprisingly, such an attitude prevailed with regard to the reform of the law on cartels. According to the SHIV the ban on cartels imposed by the EC competition law was restricted to the international exchange of goods and services, while the Swiss competition law allowing cartels with certain restrictions remained valid for the domestic market. 30 The extension of the regulating activities of the European Commission from the single market programme towards labour market and social policies was observed with apprehension, but these topics were not part of the EEA-negotiations yet.
31
In the view of the SHIV, the EEA was basically a good idea, but it also raised a major problem: the EFTA countries had to integrate all the relevant laws (the 'Acquis communautaires') into their national legal order. Hopes of obtaining the same rights as the EC-countries in the decision-making process, or at least some possibility to deviate from EC-rules were quickly squashed. For the EFTA-countries the situation was clear enough: total autonomy of the EC and total homogeneity of the EEA. This implied that in all current and future areas regulated by the EC the EFTA-countries had to adapt their national legislation without being able to participate in the decision-making process.
32 Under these circumstances, joining the EC became more attractive and the EEA was increasingly perceived as a transitional agreement: Sweden applied for membership in the EC in July 1991 and Finland in March 1992.
33 For the SHIV, joining the EC was still no option, because it was assumed that there was no majority in case of a referendum on such a step. The other alternative was characterised as 'splendid isolation' and was dismissed as an illusionary concept. The only realistic option was an EEA-treaty that was acceptable for both sides.
34 In June 1990 negotiations were taken up, and representatives of the SHIV participated in several of the negotiating groups. Negotiations were reported as difficult, for institutional and legal reasons and for the fact, that the EC had linked the question of transit traffic with the treaty on the EEA. 35 In the course of the negotiations all obstacles were overcome, but the result was satisfactory only as a transitional agreement. After negotiations had been concluded in October 1991 the participating ministers of the Swiss Federal Government declared that the final objective for Switzerland was to join the EC and that the EEA-Treaty was a useful step on the way to complete integration.
36
On the basis of a broad internal survey among its members the SHIV approved the EEA-Treaty and the objective to join the EC later on was commented on favourably.
37 But such a step should be made only after the EEA-Treaty had been accepted in the compulsory referendum scheduled for September 1992 and the EC-law (EUROLEX) integrated into Swiss law. In its external communication the SHIV made great efforts in convincing the voters of the advantages of the EEA for the Swiss economy, but its impact was, of course, limited by the activities of other interest groups.
38
ASSOCIATION OF THE SWISS MACHINE INDUSTRIALISTS (VSM)
The VSM and its numerous subgroups were all members of the corresponding European associations, where all information concerning the EEC was available quickly and reliably. The main European connection was ORGALIME (Organisme de Liaison des Industries Métalliques Européennes).
39 The VSM participated actively in the various working groups and committees. While practically all the subgroups were linked with European associations of the same branches, only very few participated also in worldwide associations. 40 The annual reports of the VSM contain little information on the activities of these groups, but it seems that their main objective during the late 1980s and early 1990s was the harmonization of Swiss regulations and norms with European regulations and norms in order to avoid competitive disadvantages for Swiss firms on the EC-market. Special committees of the VSM were continuously observing the revisions of legal rules in Switzerland, in the European context and on the international level. These committees intervened on the national level by commenting on drafts for new rules and indicating possible problems if the proposed regulation was not harmonized with the corresponding EC-guidelines. Some members of the VSM were active in the committee on intellectual property of the SHIV and in working groups of UNICE.
41
From 1988 onwards the creation of the European single market and its consequences for the Swiss firms in the machine industry was the main theme dealt with in the annual reports. The topics discussed were: product liability, the rules for certification and examination, patent law, trademark protection law and copy right. In the field of technical harmonization great importance was attached to the Greenbook on the development of European norms for the realisation of the single European market.
42
The EEA-negotiations were initiated in 1989. The member firms were continuously kept informed in "Europa-Seminarien" and workshops. Quite generally, European integration had a high priority in the public relations activities of the association. 43 The attitude of the VSM was clear: As long as the regulations in Switzerland differed, the Swiss manufacturers had a disadvantage compared to their competitors in the EEC. Consequently, such differences had to be eliminated or avoided. 44 The result of a survey among the VSM-members showed a broad approval of this position.
45 This attitude also prevailed in some fields, which had been previously excluded from integration (namely energy and water supplies, traffic systems and telecommunication). A survey revealed that more than 86% of the firms agreed to open those markets for the whole EEA.
46 With regard to R&D policies, the attitude of the VSM was less ambiguous than the position of the SHIV. It claimed full participation of Switzerland in the EC-programmes and, with regard to financial support, similar conditions as for the firms in the other EC and EFTA countries. 47 This aim was achieved in 1991. 48 The result of another sur-vey on the question whether Switzerland should accept the EEA-Treaty were also clear-cut: 90% of the firms approved, and the remaining 10% favoured direct membership in the EC, no firm voted to go it alone.
49
Notwithstanding the priority assigned to European integration, high importance was also attributed to the GATT-negotiations.
50 Given the hectic pace prevailing in the EEC, the VSM feared that the process of European integration might delay the successful conclusion of the Uruguay round. For the Swiss machine industry an open world trade system was almost as important as participating in the single European market, since over a third of the exports of the machine industry were delivered to other world regions.
51
SWISS SOCIETY OF CHEMICAL INDUSTRIES (SSCI)
The chemical-pharmaceutical industry is one of the most globally oriented Swiss industries. The European market was important, especially for imports, but since the late 1970s the US have been the most attractive market because of higher income levels and growth rates and a less regulated health sector. The Swiss Society of Chemical Industries (SSCI) had links with other national and international business associations and its delegates participated in a large number of governmental committees.
52 In national policy matters, the SSCI usually intervened indirectly as a member of the SHIV. On the international level links with the European Chemical Association had been established right from its foundation in 1959. The whole network included around fifteen international organisations, of which about two thirds were European associations.
Due to its global orientation, the main interest with regard to international trade was a liberal world trade system without protectionist policies and trade barriers. These objectives were pursued on the level of the GATT, but progress was slow and the results of the various rounds of negotiations disappointing. Also for the SSCI, the EEC as rule-setter remained marginal up to the middle of the 1980s, its impact was limited to questions of origin and the customs tariff between EC and EFTA. The basis for negotiations was the European free trade agreement concluded in 1972. With regard to such questions, cooperation with CEFIC (European Chemical Industry Council) proved highly satisfactory.
53
At first, plans of the EEC to create a single European market were a matter of concern, because the SSCI feared the formation of trade blocs. In its perspective, the European Chemical Association had an important role in preventing such an outcome. 54 The section on foreign trade of the SSCI was concerned about the changing relationship between EEC and EFTA. The position of Switzerland was clearly weakened, because EFTA was losing members and often the remaining members did not support the Swiss position. The question was how to avoid the marginalisation of Switzerland. The SSCI favoured approaching the EEC by the means of bilateral agreements and to strive for parallelism of the law setting process in Switzerland. Joining the EC was out of question for well-known reasons.
55
Other areas of concern, namely health and environmental protection as well as transports of dangerous goods were dealt with either in the national context or on the international level (UNO, WHO, UNEC, FAO, GATT; OECD). The influence of the EEC in matters of traffic and transport became more pronounced only in the early 1990s. The special problems related to trade with pharmaceuticals, namely the increasing intervention of the state on price-setting policies, was not perceived as a specific European problem. Similar tendencies were present in countries of other world regions too. These tendencies were strongest in some important European countries, but it was the result of their national policies and not of European integration. The situation changed with the creation of the single European market and the EEA.
The chemical-pharmaceutical industry was clearly the leader with regard to R&D expenditures in Switzerland. Not surprisingly, the means to protect trademarks and patents were of major interest. Also in this respect, the influence of the EEC was absent in the early 1980s. These topics were dealt with either on the national level or within international organisations (OECD, UNCTAD, GATT). In the case of patent protection, the national rules became more efficient, but also less important, because Swiss firms rarely used the national channels for patent protection. The EEC played an active role with regard to product liability and consumer protection, strongly influenced by developments in the US. In the late 1980s and early1990s, developments in the EEC strongly influenced the national law-setting processes also with regard to the law on trademarks and patents.
56
Quite generally, new legislation in the national context was approved if the developments in the EEC were taken into account; the process of legislation was suspended, if the corresponding process within the EEC was uncertain.
The attitude of the SSCI with regard to the creation of a single European market was in general quite positive. The society campaigned for the 'Europafähig-keit' of the chemical industry in Switzerland. Renouncing on 'customised' Swiss guidelines for environmental protection was a possibility to demonstrate solidarity with Europe and the positive attitude of the Swiss chemical industry towards the single market. The official acknowledgment of the concept of 'Europafähigkeit' as an aim of economic policy, implying strengthening the competitiveness of Swiss firms in general and establishing legal compatibility with EC rules was highly welcomed.
57 Avoiding disparities between EC guidelines and Swiss regulations was a main objective of the SSCI.
The SSCI had regular contacts to the Swiss delegations negotiating the EEA agreement. In 1991, the agreement was described as unbalanced, inadequate as a durable instrument of integration. Consequently, the SSCI would approve the 55 SGCI, Annual Report 1986, p. 10.
56 SGCI, Annual Reports 1988, p. 27, and 1991, p. 28 treaty only if, subsequently, Switzerland joined the EC. The association suggested that the federal government deposit an application for membership. Only under these circumstances, the SSCI would be able to agree to the Treaty on the EEA.
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At the beginning of the 1990s, the position of the SSCI had become clearly proEuropean. In its view, the EEA was acceptable as a temporary, transitional solution, but in the long term, only full membership in the EC was the adequate form of relationship.
Notwithstanding its strong involvement in the EEA negotiations, the SSCI continued to support all activities aiming at expanding and strengthening the liberal world trade system. The necessary condition was the successful conclusion of the Uruguay round of the GATT.
SCHWEIZERISCHER GEWERBEVERBAND (SGV)
The SGV is the federation of the mainly inward-oriented branches of the Swiss economy. Consequently, domestic topics dominated even in the late 1980s and early 1990s, when European integration became a major theme even for this organisation. The SGV participated in a large number of federal committees and in the organisations of tertiary education, but it had only two links with international organisations: the 'Conférence internationale du travail' and the 'Union internationale de l'artisanat et des petites et moyennes enterprise' (Internationale Gewerbeunion, IGU). 59 The SGV was not a member organisation of the SHIV, but often cooperated with regard to specific topics.
The annual reports contain little information on the activities of the SGV and its subgroups. Up to 1989, developments regarding EEC, EFTA and EEA are mentioned very briefly. In the view of the SGV, those topics concerned first of all the export-oriented sectors of the economy. Even if it was acknowledged that the creation of a single European market was important also for the internal market, these effects were perceived as rather marginal. The federation adopted a defensive attitude and focused on those areas and rules, which should be kept untouched from developments in the EEC.
60
Only in the early 1990s, the formation of the EEA was acknowledged as a main theme of economic policy in Switzerland and commented on more extensively. Having largely neglected this policy area, the SGV was hardly able to keep pace with the rapid developments on the European level.
61 The member firms asked for more information with regard to European integration, and therefore a working group was established in 1990. It had the task to analyse the possible alternative scenarios for the relationship of Switzerland with the EEA and the EC. 
63
In 1991, the EEA was the main theme in the section on economic policy of the annual report. It was now clear that the EEA agreement would have important consequences for the national laws in various fields (cartel law, submission law, technical norms, product liability, copy right, agrarian policy, property laws, regulations on foreign labour, corporation law, the education and social systems, consumer law, etc.). Overwhelmed by all these changes, the Committee of the SGV decided that the EEA was politically unacceptable. 64 In its view, the successful conclusion of the Uruguay-round of the GATT was to form a kind of safety net for small export dependent countries and a means to deal with the obstacles, which would inevitably result from the creation of the EEA.
65
The EEA and the single market were the dominant themes also in 1992. The consequences of joining the EEA in various fields were now commented on more extensively. 66 The adaptations included in the EUROLEX-package amounted to the modifications of about 60 laws and 100 regulations.
67 Nonetheless, at the extraordinary 'Schweizerischer Gewerbekongress' in September 1992 (the second extraordinary congress since the foundation of the SGV in 1879), the delegates of all member organisations said 'yes' to the EEA (with 549:456 votes). The majority of the delegates may have been convinced of the advantages of joining the EEA, especially for the large number of sub-suppliers of the export-industries, the minority was probably scared by the far-reaching and uncertain consequences of accepting the EEA-Treaty.
THE REJECTION OF THE EEA AND ITS IMPACT ON THE PROCESS OF EUROPEANIZATION
Notwithstanding the broad support from the main business associations, the Treaty on the EEA was rejected in the referendum voted on December 6, 1992, with a small majority of votes (50,3%) and a large majority of the cantons (16:7).
68
Resistance had mainly been organised by the right wing party, the 'Schweizerische Volkspartei' (SVP). For the export-oriented business associations the negative result of the referendum came as a shock. The path of 'going it alone' had been chosen, a path, which the SHIV had dismissed as illusionary and practically excluded as a possible alternative.
The immediate reaction of the Swiss government to the negative result of the referendum was to proceed with the implementation of the EUROLEX-package, just as if it had been accepted. 69 The main objective in the longer term was to negotiate bilateral agreements with the EU in order to reach a similar level of economic integration as the countries within the EEA. The SHIV fully supported this programme of minimising any negative consequences. All options vis-à-vis Europe had to be kept open and all measures improving the competitiveness of Swiss firms in the EU-market were to be undertaken immediately. 70 The strategy pursued before had been to achieve substantial economic reforms by participating in the EEA. This strategy had become obsolete and had to be replaced by an autonomous programme of internal reform in order to avoid any discrimination resulting from differences between the Swiss and the European legal systems.
In the literature on institutional change in Switzerland it is widely acknowledged that the impact of European integration on institutional change continued to be quite strong. 71 However, given the new room of manoeuvre, it was no longer necessary to accept the whole package of the 'Acquis communautaires'. 72 Taking part in the process of European integration had to be balanced against possible disadvantages in non-EU markets. Competition law was one of those areas where the SHIV wanted to stick to the weaker domestic rules.
73 Wide room was also dedicated to the discussion of the different attitudes of the EC and Switzerland with regard to the energy industry. In this respect, the SHIV relied on the European Energy-Charta, where Switzerland continued to participate as fully-fledged partner. With regard to the liberalisation of the Swiss postal services, the Greenbook of the EC remained an important point of reference.
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The importance of Europe as the main market for exports and imports had also changed, not so much with regard to the actual shares of exports and imports in GDP, but with regard to future prospects. Europe's growth rates, especially those of the large countries were low, while the US economy and the economies of the Far East were booming. The shift of attention towards the higher level of world wide economic integration is visible already in 1993. Being able to represent the interests of Swiss industry by taking part in the various activities of UNICE was perceived as being even more important than before the rejection of the EAA, but more weight was also given to supporting the successful conclusion of the Uruguay round within the GATT.
